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, it affects the costs of producing a customised good.
Intuitively, if the production of an intermediate good requires specific investments to customize the input to the production of the final good, the value of the input is lower outside the specific relationship supplierbuyer than inside this relationship. Therefore, there is an incentive for the supplier to under-invest ex ante and to produce a lower quality good. Since this incentive is lower for suppliers located in countries with better contract enforcement, these countries will have an advantage in producing customised intermediate goods (Levchenko, 2007; Antràs, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2007; Costinot, 2005) . 4 The importance of organizing and locating prodution in a way that ensures the timely delivery of parts and components also matters. According to the literature, timeliness matters for trade in intermediate goods as it is essential to the management of the production chain (Nordas, 2007) . Delays in delivery increase the cost of holding stocks, impede rapid responses to changes in customers oders and limit the ability to rapidly detect, fix and replace 2 Figures A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix illustrate this phenomenon for a selected number of countries. 3 See Williamson (1985) , Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) for seminal contributions. 4 Another branch of the literature has focussed on the importance of the ability to enforce contracts for the share of intra-firm trade. See, for example, the theoretical models developed by Antras (2003) , Antras and Helpman (2004) , and Grossman and Helpman (2005) and the empirical studies on the determinants of the share of intra-firm trade by Bernard et al. (2010) , Nunn and Trefler (2008) , and Corcos et al. (2009). defective components. Focusing on these costs, Harrigan and Venables (2004) show that the demand for timeliness in delivery generates incentives for the clustering of plants around the assembler or retailer.
Guided by this literature, we test whether countries' ability to enforce contracts and their ability to export on time play a different role in trade of intermediate and in that of final goods. If production occurs as a sequence of tasks and various inputs are all essential to the production of the final good, an input that is not of the required quality (because of the underinvestment due to the hold-up problem) or is missing at the time when it is required (because of export delays) may nullify the value of all other inputs/tasks. Therefore, no discount can compensate the producer of the final good for the unreliable delivery (Kremer, 1993) . In contrast, when a good is imported for final consumption, it is plausible that the consumer may accept to buy it for a reduced price even if it is of a lower quality than required or if it is delivered with a delay. For example, while a car manufacturer will not be willing to use a cheap radio in a luxurious car, a consumer that has ordered an expensive radio may compromise on the quality if he gets an adequate discount.
Our empirical strategy consists in estimating a factor content model of trade. In this model, the ability to enforce contracts and to export on time is assumed to determine a country's pattern of trade according to its comparative advantage rather than its trade volume. Hence, we test whether countries with better ability to enforce contracts (export on time) export relatively more institutional-intensive (time-sensitive) goods. In particular, using the UN Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification to categorize goods according to their main end use 5 , we test whether a country's ability to enforce a contract and its ability to export on time are more important determinants of comparative advantage in intermediate goods than in final goods.
Our paper adds to the existing literature by testing whether the hold-up problem and time matter for the patterns of trade in intermediate goods. Although the theoretical literature defines the hold-up problem with respect to intermediate inputs, previous studies assessing the role of the quality of institutions as a determinant of trade patterns have focused on trade in final goods (which are produced using intensively intermediate goods) rather than on trade in intermediate goods themselves (Nunn, 2007; Levchenko, 2007). 6 Similarly, while the importance of timely delivery has been stressed in particular in relation to production 5 Recently, other studies have used the BEC classification to study the patterns of trade in intermediate goods (Bergstrand and Egger, 2010; Miroudot et al., 2009) . Our approach, however, is conceptually different from these studies, as they use the gravity model to study the volume of trade, while we focus on the factor content methodology to determine the sectoral pattern of trade. 6 Institutional differences are found to be an important determinant of trade flows in a number of recent studies that use the gravity model of trade. For example, Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) and de Groot et al. (2004) show that quality of institutions significantly affects bilateral trade volumes and that better institutions are associated with higher volumes of trade. These models however do not look at institutions as factors affecting comparative advantage.
networks, there is no study to our knowledge that estimats the importance of time for trade in intermediate goods. (Brun et al. 2005; Coe et al. 2007; Melitz, 2007; Disdier and Head, 2008) -that is the typical finding of gravity models that the elasticity of trade flows to distance has been rising over time. We show that the distance coefficient for trade in intermediate goods is higher and increases faster than that for total trade. This supports the view that the distance-puzzle can, to a certain extent, be explained by the growing phenomenon of vertical specialisation and just-in-time production.
Our findings have important policy implications. They suggest that improving institutions, investing in infrastructure, and fostering trade facilitation would significantly boost a country's participation -especially a developing country's participation-in production networks.
To develop these arguments, section II presents the empirical specification and discusses our methodological approach. Section III describes the data and provides summary statistics. In section IV we present and discuss our main results and robustness checks. Section V derives some implications in terms of the so-called distance puzzle. Finally, section VI concludes.
II. Methodological Approach
We analyse the role that a country's ability to enforce contracts and its ability to export on time have in determining trade patterns using a factor content methodology. A similar approach has been used by Romalis (2004) to assess the importance of traditional factor endowments (capital and labour) as sources of comparative advantage, by Nunn (2007) and Levchenko (2007) to estimate the role of institutions, and by Djankov, Freund and Pham (2010) and Li and Wilson (2009) to assess the role of time delays. In particular,
we adopt the following empirical specification:
(1) where ij X is the logarithm of exports of country i to the world in the 6-digit NAICS industry j in the year 2000. Equation (1) We address potential endogeneity problems arising from omitted variables problems or from reverse causality. A concern is, for example, that trade (specialisation) in institutional-intensive sectors could stimulate institutional reforms or that trade in time-sensitive sectors could foster investments in transport infrastructure. To address these issues, first, we adopt a factor content methodology that, as noted in Djankov, Freund and Pham (2010) , presents the advantage that it minimises identification problems.
Second, we use country and industry fixed effects in all regressions to minimise omitted variable bias. Third, we also use instrumental variables (IV) estimations. In particular, we use the legal origin of a country's legal system as an instrument for quality of institutions, and, focusing on a subsample of landlocked countries, we use the average quality of infrastructure of its neighbouring countries as an instrument for the quality of infrastructure of each landlocked country. The results of instrumental variables regressions and other robustness checks are presented in section IV.
III. Data Sources and Variable Definitions
Data on trade flows, factor endowments and factor intensity are from standard sources. The year under consideration is 2000. Exports data at the SITC Rev. 3 5-digit level are from the OECD International Trade Commodity Statistics (ITCS) database. We use the UN Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification to define intermediate goods. We then map these data to 6-digit NAICS 1997 industries using the correspondence table from Feenstra et al. (2002) . The BEC classification groups products into four categories of goods according to their main end use, i.e. intermediate, consumption, capital goods and not classified goods. 8 The world share of trade in terms of these four categories is reported in exchange, reference priced goods and non-reference priced goods. The assumption is that the production of non-reference priced goods requires a relatively high level of relation-specific investments so that these goods are more subject to the hold-up problem than goods sold on an organised exchage or reference priced goods. As suggested by Nunn (2007) , the fact that a good is traded on an organised exchange indicates that its market is thick, hence there is limited scope for the hold-up problem to emerge. Similarly, the fact that a good is reference priced in a publication may be thought of as an indication that there is a reasonable number of potential buyers and sellers of that good,limiting potential hold-up problems. Following Hummels (2001) correlation is positive and significant for capital intensity, not significant for skilled labour intensity, and negative and significant for both institutional intensity and timeliness. In line with existing literature, we find that the quality of institution is an important determinant of total trade patterns (Set A). That is, countries with good rule of law specialise in institutional-intensive industries.
IV. Results

A. Comparative advantage in intermediate and final goods trade
Similarly, when we include the interaction term for timely delivery, we find that countries with high quality of infrastructure have a comparative advantage in time-sensitive industries.
Comparing the magnitude of the effects of the different interaction terms, we find that quality of institutions These results are surprisingly at odds with the emphasis given by recent trade theory to the international hold-up problem as a determiniant of offshoring at least as to the choice of where to offshore is concerned.
Rather, they support the view of Harrigan and Venables (2004) , who suggest that timeliness is crucial for the integration of countries into global production networks while it is less important for serving final consumers. 
B. Robustness Checks
As a first test for the robustness of the results, we estimate equation (2) using alternative measures for the quality of the institutional environment and the ability to deliver in time. Results are reported in Table 7 . We consistently find that the ability to deliver on time is a significant determinant of comparative advantage also when it is measured by the days required to export (columns A.1 and B.1) or by the index of transport infrastructure -calculated as an average of the quality of rail, road, air and port infrastructure (columns A.2 and B.2). We also find that the coefficients for the quality of institution is significant and of the expected sign also when the quality of institutions is proxied by the time and the cost required to enforce a contract (columns A.3-A.4 and B.3-A.4) . Note that since we expect that lengthy times and high costs denote scarse ability to enforce contracts, a negative coefficient on these variables denote that countries with better enforceability conditions have a comparative advantage in institutional intensive goods.
The results also confirm that timeliness rather than institutional quality is the most important factor in Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of intermediate or all other (consumption) exports in industry k by country i to the World. Coefficients are beta standardized and t-values for robust standard errors are reported in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
As a further robustness check, we run the regressions for the subsample of "homogeneous" industries, i.e.
industries which produce either only intermediate or only consumption goods. The rationale for this additional test is the following: While industry intensities related to institutions and timeliness are broken down by BEC categories because they are based on product information, this is not possible for capital and skilled labour intensities. Hence, if an industry consists of intermediate and consumption goods, we have to assume that all goods in this industry are produced using the same capital and skilled labour intensity. To address this shortcoming, we rerun our main regressions for a set of homogenous industries consisting of either only intermediate or only consumption goods. By focusing on the subsample of "intermediate goods-
only" and "consumption goods-only" industries, we can ensure that the measure of capital and labour intensity we use are industry specific to the good they refer to. The results of these regressions (reported in Although, as discussed in section II, our methodological approach as well as the inclusion of country and industry fixed effect limit the scope for endogeneity, one must be cautious in interpreting the OLS estimate as causal. It is in fact possible that the relationship between infrastructure and institutions on one side and trade on the other side is reversed. That is, countries that specialise in contract intensive (time sensitive)
industries may have greater incentive to develop a good contract enforcement environment (good infrastructure). To address this endogeneity bias, we use instrumental variables regressions to estimate our model (1).
In particular, to address the problem of a possible endogeneity of the quality of infrastructure, we follow Djankov, Freund and Pham (2010) and run the regressions for a subsample of landlocked countries using the average quality of infrastructure of neighbouring countries as instrumental variables. The idea is that while exports of a landlocked county might affect its infrastructure, it will not affect the investment in infrastructure of its neighbours. However, the infrastructure quality of its neighbours will affect the landlocked country's ability to export timely since exports will have to transit through at least one of its neighbours. Table 9 provides the results of the IV regressions obtained using the average quality of transport infrastructure of neighbouring countries as instrument for the transport infrastructure of landlocked countries.
Since we only focus on landlocked countries, the number of countries left in the regressions shrinks to 13.
Results confirm that if countries improve their infrastructure quality, they will indeed experience an increase in exports in time-sensitive sectors. In particular, quality of infrastructure is more important in determining comparative advanatage in intermediate goods than in final goods (where for this subsample they do not appear even to be sigificant). Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of exports in industry j by country i to the World. txT is instrumented using txIV where the instrument is the average infrastructure of neighbouring countries. Reported are the beta standardized coefficients of the second stage IV regression with t-values shown in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
As far as potential endogeneity problems of the quality of institutions are concerned, we also estimate equation (1) Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of exports in industry k by country i to the World. qxQ is instrumented using qxIV where the instrument (IV) is a variable that assumes the value of the average quality of institution across all countries with the same legal origin. Reported are the beta standardized coefficients of the second stage IV regression with t-values shown in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
V. The Distance Puzzle Revisited
Our finding that timeliness is particularly important as a determinant of trade in intermediate goods supports Harrigan and Venables (2004) 's view that fragmentation of production is a force of agglomeration and suggests that intermediate goods should be more sensitive to distance than final goods. To support our findings, in this section we also assess whether these expectations hold true using an alternative methodological approach: the standard gravity model of bilateral trade flows. In doing so, we also relate our results to the recent literature on the so-called "distance puzzle", that is the typical finding of gravity models that, contrary to expectations, the elasticity of trade flows to distance has been rising over time (Brun et al., 2005; Coe et al., 2007; Melitz, 2007; Disdier and Head, 2008) A r g e n t i n a A u s t r a l i a B e l g i u m B r a z i l C a n a d a C h i l e C h i n a G e r m a n y F r a n c e A r g e n t i n a A u s t r a l i a B e l g i u m B r a z i l C a n a d a C h i l e C h i n a G e r m a n y F r a n c e U n i t e d K i n g d o m I n d o n e s i a I n d i a I t a l y J a p a n K o r e a M e x i c o S l o v e n i a T h a i l a n d T u r k e y C h i n e s e T h a i p e i U n i t e d S t a t e s S o u t h A f r i c a
